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ABSTRACT
Throughout the course of World War I, the Irish regiments that fought on the 
front lines were staffed only with volunteers. Though Britain had extended conscription 
within the United Kingdom and to its other colonies, Ireland was exempt from drafting 
soldiers for the war effort. Though the idea of conscripting the Irish had been discussed 
on multiple occasions within the House of Commons, the motion was always rejected 
due to the volatile relationship between the two countries. Besides, nearly 200,000 
Irishmen volunteered throughout the course of the war.
By 1918, things had changed dramatically. The British and Allied forces had 
lost ground to the advancing Germans, heavy casualties were sustained on both sides, 
and the British were finding it increasingly difficult to find manpower. In April of 1918 
the idea of Irish conscription was revisited, this time with overwhelming support in the 
House of Commons, and the motion passed with a staggering majority. In addition, 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George included a provision in the bill to make Irish Home 
Rule conditional on conscription. The Irish Conscription Crisis defined the next couple 
of months in Ireland. The Irish Conscription Crisis featured widespread protests, 
strikes, and increased feelings of alienation from Britain.
This thesis focuses on the Conscription Crisis of 1918 as a window into the 
complex relationship between Britain, Ireland, and the different political factions within 
Ireland that were polarized by extension of conscription to Ireland. First, the thesis
examines the historical spatial separation of Ulster and the southern counties, the 
creation of difference, and the development of national consciousness in the south. 
Secondly, the thesis explores the years leading up to the Conscription Crisis and 
examines the tactics used by the British to recruit the Irish for the war effort and the 
notion of volunteerism within Irish regiments. Finally, the thesis demonstrates that the 
protests surrounding the Conscription Crisis in both the southern counties and in Ulster 
were not merely demonstrations against the forcible taking of men for the war effort. In 
fact, the protests were themselves manifestations of nationalism and antinationalism in a 
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INTRODUCTION
And now he sang for these ruined men, these doomed listeners, these 
wretched fools of men come out to fight a war without a country to their 
name, the slaves of England, the kings of nothing.
-Sebastian Barry, A  L ong, L o n g  W ay1
“Recruiting in Ireland was killed for party purposes in order to kill Home Rule 
or self-government for Ireland,” Mr. C. Owens claimed in a meeting with the Navan 
Guardians in response to the prospect of the enactment of Irish conscription in spring of 
1918. Britain, he argued, “would prefer to lose the war with Germany than give liberty 
to this country.”2 Owens suggested that the Irish should protest conscription and resist 
at any cost because “we might as well die here as any other place.”3 Although Britain 
had enacted conscription within the United Kingdom and its colonies in 1916, Ireland 
had been exempt from drafting soldiers for the war effort due to the volatile relationship 
between the two countries. Nevertheless, nearly 200,000 Irishmen volunteered 
throughout the course of the war, but by 1918, things had changed dramatically. The 
British and Allied forces had lost ground to the advancing Germans, heavy casualties 
were sustained on both sides, and the British were finding it increasingly difficult to 
find manpower.4 In April of 1918, the idea of Irish conscription was revisited, this time
1 Sebastian Barry, A Long, Long Way (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).2 “A People Who Will Never Be Coerced...,” Meath Chronicle, April 13, 1918.3 “A People Who Will Never Be Coerced.,” Meath Chronicle, April 13, 1918.4Adrian Gregory, “The Decision to Conscript the Irish,” in Ireland and the Great War: A War to Unite 
Us All?, eds. Adrian Gregory and Senia Paseta (New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 113.
with overwhelming support in the House of Commons, and the motion passed with a 
staggering majority.
This Irish conscription bill included a provision for Home Rule, promising a 
measure of self-governance to Ireland after the war that was conditional on their 
conscription. This provoked widespread resistance within Ireland that crossed political, 
religious, and social lines, leading to what historians have termed “the Irish 
Conscription Crisis.” This crisis featured widespread protests, strikes, and increased 
feelings of alienation from Britain among diverse communities in Ireland. It enraged 
Nationalists and Republicans (predominantly in the South) who viewed it as another 
form of oppression handed down by the British. But, significantly, it also angered 
Unionists (predominantly in the North) who felt that the provision that guaranteed 
Home Rule would put them at the mercy of the more populous Nationalists and 
Catholics of the South. Hence the old Unionist adage, “Home Rule is Rome Rule.”5
Many historians have treated the Irish Conscription Crisis as a minor incident in 
a long chain of events that led to the Anglo-Irish War. Other more prominent events 
such as the Easter Rising, the Home Rule Crisis, and the General Election of 1918 tend 
to take precedence over the relatively brief, failed attempt by the British to conscript the 
Irish. The Conscription Crisis, which lasted only a few months and passed with hardly 
any bloodshed, has taken a back seat in histories of the Anglo-Irish relationship to other 
more watershed moments of the Irish Revolution. However, some historians consider 
the Crisis an important event and connect it to the larger events that led to Irish 
independence. For example, Thomas Hennessy relates the protests surrounding
5 Lawrence J. McCaffrey, “Irish Nationalism and Irish Catholicism: A Study in Cultural Identity,”
Church History, 42, no. 4 (December 1973): 524-534.
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3conscription to the growing distrust of the words of British politicians and (like 
historian Caoimhe Nic Dhaibheid) demonstrates that in the months following the Crisis 
membership of the radical Republican Party Sinn Fein doubled.6 Peter Hart links the 
Crisis to a jump in the membership of the IRA.7 In addition, Tom Bowden suggests that 
the Crisis had the effect of polarizing political factions in Ireland.8 Others, such as 
Deirdre Lindsay, argue that the Conscription Crisis led to a greater prominence of the 
Irish Labour Party in the South as they were chiefly responsible for massive strikes and 
resistance rallies, which alienated them from their support base in Ulster.9
Aside from the effect that the Crisis had on Irish political parties and radical 
groups, historians have also placed the Irish Conscription Crisis in the context of British 
politics and the European war effort. Alan J. Ward blames the blunders of the 
Conscription Crisis on Prime Minister David Lloyd George, whom he claims, “failed to 
control, understand, or inform himself about Ireland.”10 Adrian Gregory and John 
McEwen suggest that perhaps Lloyd George had no intention of ever enforcing 
conscription in Ireland and only enacted it to quell the growing pressure from the 
British public.11 Moreover, Gregory implies that this could have also been a way for
6 Thomas Hennessey, Dividing Ireland (London: Routledge, 1998), 220-228; Caoimhe Nic Dhaibheid, 
“The Irish National Aid Association and the Radicalization of Public Opinion in Ireland 1916-1918,” The 
Historical Journal, 55, no. 3 (September 2012): 706.7Peter Hart, “The Social Structure of the Irish Republican Army 1916-1923,” The Historical Journal 42, 
No. 1 (March 1999): 219.8
Tom Bowden, “The Irish Underground and the War of Independence 1919-1921,” Journal o f  
Contemporary History 8, no. 2 (April 1973), 11.
Dierdre Lindsay, “Labour Against Conscription,” in Ireland and the First World War, ed. David 
Fitzpatrick (Co. Westmeath, Ireland: The Liliput Press, 1988), 77-89.
10 Alan J Ward, “Lloyd George and the 1918 Irish Conscription Crisis,” The Historical Journal 17, No. 1 
(March 1974): 107.
11 John McEwen, “The Liberal Party and the Irish Question During World War I,” Journal o f British 
Studies 12, no. 1 (November 1972): 109-131; Adrian Gregory, “The Decision to Conscript the Irish,” in 
Ireland and the Great War: A War to Unite Us All?, eds. Adrian Gregory and Senia Paseta (New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), 128-129.
Lloyd George to rid himself of the “Irish Question.”12 There are also claims that Lloyd 
George acted in response to the depletion of troops on the front lines and pressure from 
outside forces such as France to replenish these forces.13
In each of these cases, historians have linked the Conscription Crisis to the 
larger narratives of World War I. In Irish Revolutionary History, the Crisis contributed 
to the radicalization of political thought and the abandonment of the campaign for a 
Home Rule Parliament. In Britain, the Crisis is linked to the desperation surrounding 
manpower needs and the growing public outcry for more troops in addition to the 
failures of Lloyd George to understand the political climate of Ireland. The 
Conscription Crisis thus provides a window into the complex relations amongst 
different political factions in Ireland and into their disparate relationships to Britain at a 
critical moment. Furthermore, the Conscription Crisis emphasizes levels of mistrust 
and misreading of relations within the United Kingdom in addition to the fissures 
between multiple groups in Ireland and Britain that help to explain the violence of the 
1920s, rather than take it as a given.
This thesis will examine the Conscription Crisis of 1918 and the events that led 
up to it in the context of the growing Nationalist movement in Ireland. First, it will 
examine the historical spatial separation of Ulster and the southern counties, the 
creation of difference, and the development of national consciousness in the south. 
Secondly, it will explore the years leading up to the Conscription Crisis, examine the 
tactics used by the British to recruit the Irish for the war effort, and the notion of
volunteerism within Irish regiments. Finally, it will demonstrate that the protests
1212 Gregory, 128-129.
13Elizabeth Greenhalgh, “David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and the 1918 Manpower Crisis,” 
The Historical Journal 50, No. 2 (June 2007): 397-421.
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surrounding the Conscription Crisis in both the southern counties and in Ulster were not 
merely demonstrations against the forcible taking of men for the war effort. In fact, the 
protests were themselves part o f  wider Nationalist debates in a country that was on the 
eve o f revolution.
This thesis argues that historians have largely diminished the Conscription 
Crisis because it was a failed attempt by the British to force enlistment of Irish soldiers 
in the British army. The decision not to enforce conscription after the passage of the 
Military Service Bill meant that the Crisis passed with little conflict or bloodshed. In 
Ireland, however, the damage had been done: the Home Rule movement was killed and 
the idea o f complete separation from Britain gained momentum. I argue that the 
importance o f the Conscription Crisis lies in the effect it had on the Irish Nationalist 
movement and the already stressed Anglo-Irish relations. Throughout the Crisis, the 
Nationalist factions within Ireland unified under a Sinn Fein banner as it became 
evident that the Irish Parliamentary Party in the House o f Commons would never make 
self-determination a reality through political channels. Ultimately, the Conscription 
Crisis was the final sign that the relationship between Ireland and Britain was damaged 
beyond repair.
5
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENCE AND 
THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
In many ways Ireland was different from Britain’s other colonies. Ireland was 
Britain’s first colony and was thus a testing ground for their rule. One main difference 
from other colonies was that the Irish were Europeans; however, the British did not 
always see the Irish as white. In order to legitimize rule, the British needed to 
demonstrate that the Irish were different and inferior to themselves and therefore needed 
to be colonized. Bruce Nelson has argued that, “in recent years scholars from a wide 
range o f  academic disciplines have noted that for the architects o f  empire, the process o f 
identity formation seems to require the creation, and demonization, o f  a colonized Other 
whose vices serve to highlight the virtues of the colonizer.”14 The British then needed 
to show that not only were the Irish different than themselves, but also inferior to them 
in every way. This led to a process that scholars have termed, “the racialization of the 
Irish—the reduction of a culturally and biologically diverse people to a monolithic 
whole and the designation o f their racial or national characteristics as the antithesis o f 
Anglo-Saxon virtue.”15 Therefore throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
stereotypes o f  the Irish as lazy, ignorant drunkards emerged and were perpetuated. 
Perhaps the most egregious o f  these were the depictions o f  the Irish as having simian
14Bruce Nelson, Irish Nationalists and the Making o f the Irish Race (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2012), 17.
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and Negro features, reducing the Irish to what the British thought was a primitive race. 
Vincent Cheng has noted that, “these racial stereotypes create comfortably, securely, 
clearly defined boundaries between the Self and the Other.. .This construction of a 
universal primitivism creates a clearly demarcated Us/Them binarity and difference 
which functions to reify the dominant Western culture’s sense of itself as civilized and 
rational by contrast.”16 By this rationale, the British not only had the right to rule, but 
rather a duty to civilize the “primitive” races. The image below (Figure 1) depicts the 
Irish as black Africans showing an Irishman sitting on an overturned basin with a club 
under his arm and a kettle for a hat; next to him is an empty bottle lying on the ground 
outside of a dilapidated shack. The title of the image is “The King of A-Shantee,” a pun 
on the African Ashanti people and the shanty shack depicted in the image. Both the 
man and his wife have apelike features, wide noses, large mouths with big lips, and a 
prominent brow. This image was meant to show the Irish as not having evolved as far 
as the British and puts them in the same category as the negative racial characterizations 
of black Africans that circulated throughout the nineteenth century. In addition, as 
Cheng noted, the depiction of the couple in the image suggests that they may be the 
missing link in the evolution between apes and black Africans.17
In addition to the primitivism associated with Africa, the racialization of the 
Irish sought to depict them as brutal and violent savages. This was accomplished by 
equating Fenianism, the violent Irish Nationalist movement of the mid-nineteenth 
century, with brutish, monstrous savagery. L. Perry Curtis has argued that, “since the 
Fenians were treated in British newspapers as little better than thugs bent on murder and
16 Vincent Cheng, Joyce, Race, and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 23.
17 Ibid, 40.
7
8dealing in treason without any legitimate grievances to speak of, they were categorized 
as dangerous political criminals; and the criminal classes, especially those involved in 
crimes of violence against persons, were already being depicted in cartoons and book 
illustrations as acutely prognathous brutes with enormous jaws and tiny brains.”20 Thus 
the racialization of the Irish was used in order to justify colonialism and the suppression 
of radical republicanism. This coincided with the emergence of evolutionary theory. 
Nelson points out that there, “was a dramatically new development in the second half of
19J. Opper, “The King of A-Shantee,” cartoon, Puck, February 15 1882, 10, no. 258: 378.
20 L. Perry Curtis, Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature (Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1971), 102.
the nineteenth century, a time when Darwinian science posited an evolutionary chain of 
being in which humans were descended directly from African apes. In this context, 
British commentators created a ‘simianized’, or apelike, Paddy whose likeness to the 
‘backward’ races of Africa was inescapable.”21 Thus the racialization of the Irish 
created a distinct point of difference between the British and the Irish. Furthermore, the 
racialization of the Irish had clear implications for the rising Nationalist movement in 
Ireland. Nadja Durbach has noted that in the nineteenth century, “marrying the older 
science of physiognomy to the new theory of evolution, political cartoonists drew Irish 
bodies as apelike prognathous monstrosities. This established the Irish in the popular 
mind as an inferior people unfit for self-rule. Indeed, from the 1860s, which were 
marked by the rise of Fenian violence, the popular press depicted the Irish as a savage 
race that had more in common with African peoples than with their British 
neighbors.”22 Republican activity in Ireland thus tended to be depicted in the press and 
in political cartoons as invariably negative and represented through the discourses of 
savagery.
Although the Nationalist movement sought to create an Irish nation along shared 
and distinct cultural lines separate from the British, within Ireland another point of 
difference was created amongst the Irish along religious lines. The historical 
development of Ulster and the southern counties contributed directly to the 
development of the Nationalist and Unionist movements that plagued Ireland 
throughout the twentieth century. Perhaps the most notorious event in the development
of Early Modern Ireland is the campaign of Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth century.
2121 Nelson, 34.
22Nadja Durbach, Spectacle o f Deformity: Freak Shows and Modern British Culture (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010), 167.
9
Historian R.M. Foster noted, “Oliver Cromwell changed the face of Irish war, 
landscape, and history.. .commissioned to enforce the control of Parliament and ensure 
the progress of the new Protestant land settlement and the transplantation of 
Catholics.”23 Cromwell was largely responsible for the development of a Protestant 
majority in Ulster, as Catholics were removed from their land and transplanted to the 
south and west. Cromwell’s murderous tactics in Ireland against Catholics led to the 
surrender of many Catholic strongholds and increased bitterness towards Protestant rule 
over the next couple of centuries.24 Cromwell’s legacy in Ireland can be found in the 
spatial developments of Ulster and the South in the years following his rule. Foster 
added, “Cromwellian Ireland lasted a decade.. .Though many changes were nominal 
only, landowning and religion now followed a sharp line of demarcation.”25 In the 
supplanting of Catholics from Ulster, a distinct spatial separation was created that 
would change the face of Irish politics for centuries to come.
Though dissent and rebellions were common after the Cromwell years, the 
creation of an Irish national identity and the Nationalist movement gained momentum in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The process of anglicanization in 
Ireland was widely apparent after over two hundred years of British Rule. The Ireland 
that had existed before British rule was gone, so what would an Irish nation without 
Britain look like? There is no question that even the most fervent Nationalist had been 
influenced by the constant, dominant control of Britain. The creation of an Irish
10
23 R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland: 1600-1972 (London: Penguin Books, 1989), 101n.
2424 Ibid, 101-116.
25 Ibid, 114.
national identity separate from Britain became the most important aspect o f  Irish 
Nationalist rhetoric.26
In order to separate themselves from British rule, the Nationalist movement had 
to create a nation where one no longer existed. In this respect, the Nationalist 
movement in Ireland supports Benedict Anderson’s work Im a g in e d  C o m m u n ities  on 
nation/state formation. Anderson defined the nation as, “an imagined political 
community -  and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”27 Under British 
rule, Ireland was not its own “imagined community,” and specifically it lacked its own 
sovereignty. Anderson added, “Nations dream of being free, and, if  under God, directly 
so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.”28 The words self 
determination emerge frequently in the Nationalist rhetoric of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, specifically when Britain attempted to conscript the Irish who felt 
that they should be able to determine for themselves i f  they were to be compelled to 
fight this war. In addition, the Nationalist movement wanted to create a sense o f 
cohesiveness amongst the Irish people. Anderson noted, “regardless o f  the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a 
deep, horizontal comradeship.”29 This led to the creation of an Irish national identity 
and Irishness that included cultural and racial sameness.
Towards the end o f the nineteenth century the Nationalist movement gained 
momentum. One o f  the most influential documents in the creation o f  an Irish nation
26 Leon O’Broin, Revolutionary Underground: The Story o f the Irish Republican Brotherhood (Dublin:
Gill and McMillan, 1976).




was Douglass Hyde’s 1892 manifesto The N ece ss ity  f o r  D e -A n g lic a n is in g  Ire la n d .
Hyde was an Irish scholar who also served as the first president of Ireland. In his 
manifesto, Hyde calls for the rejection of English culture and a revival of the culture 
and customs that made Ireland distinct. Hyde wrote, “It has always been very curious 
to me how Irish sen tim en t. continues to apparently hate the English and at the same 
time continues to imitate them; how it continues to clamour for recognition as a distinct 
nationality, and at the same time throws away with both hands what would make it 
so.”30 The Irish, Hyde argued, could only make a distinct Irish nation by celebrating the 
things that made them Irish and not mimicking the English. This meant a revival of 
Gaelic language, Irish music, poetry, and sports. Hyde added, “It is just because there 
appears no earthly change of their [Irish] becoming good members of the Empire that I 
urge that they should not remain in the anomalous position they are in, but since they 
absolutely refuse to become the one thing, that they become the other; cultivate what 
they have rejected, and build up an Irish nation on Irish lines.”31 Hyde’s manifesto was 
not so much a suggestion to Irish Nationalists, but rather an indictment of the Irish 
deliberately throwing away their culture to imitate the English. “Within the last ninety 
years,” Hyde stated, “We have, with unparalleled frivolity, deliberately thrown away 
our birthright and Anglicanised ourselves.”32 Hyde’s manifesto was so effective in 
inspiring an Irish nation because it was bipartisan; it was aimed at both Nationalists and 
Unionists. Hyde concluded, “I appeal to every one whatever his politics—for this is no 
political matter—to do his best to help the Irish race to develop in future upon Irish




lines, even at the risk of encouraging national aspirations, because upon Irish lines alone 
can the Irish race once more become what it was of yore— one of the most original, 
artistic, literary, and charming peoples of Europe.”33 Hyde’s manifesto is reminiscent 
of Anderson’s assertion of imagined nationhood in that it prescribed the creation of an 
Irish nation along cultural lines with shared language, arts, and culture even though all 
Irish were not the same. Despite Hyde’s manifesto being apolitical and nonreligious, it 
was taken up in the Nationalist movement and its rhetoric became a point of difference 
from the Unionist cause.
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth 
century the Nationalist movement concentrated on attempting to secure Home Rule for 
Ireland. Home Rule was defined as having a local Irish Parliament that oversaw local 
affairs and domestic issues, but still had Imperial federal obligations to Britain. Home 
Rule bills went before Parliament in 1886 and 1893 but were rejected. Finally in 1912 a 
Home Rule bill was passed through Parliament and set to be enacted, but was put on 
hold due to the outbreak of World War I. In fact, the Easter Rising in 1916 and Anglo- 
Irish violence that followed the war ensured that it was never enacted. The question 
before Parliament was always whether Home Rule could exist with Ulster. Every time 
Home Rule was considered in Parliament the question of Ulster was fiercely debated.
As part of the United Kingdom, the majority Unionists in Ulster enjoyed protection 
from Britain. However under Home Rule, Ulster would be (in their view) at the mercy 
of the more populous southern Catholics and Nationalists. During a Home Rule debate 
in the House of Lords in 1914, the Marquess of Lansdowne spoke of the plight of
13
3333 Ibid, 170.
Unionists in Ulster: “Let me use a very homely illustration,” he began. “There is a great 
difference between telling a man that he is not to have a new coat and tearing off his 
back the coat which he is already wearing. That is what you are going to do in Ulster, 
and the reason why the resentment in Ulster is so intense and so irreconcilable is that 
the people of Ulster feel that you are taking away from them something that they have 
got and driving them into a position which they regard, and I think not without good 
reason, as an intolerable and odious position.”34 Unionists felt that if  Home Rule were 
enacted they  would be forced into a position of subservience to the Nationalists, which 
was the same way the Nationalists felt about their relationship to Britain. The 
alternative that was debated was partition: a separation of Ulster from the rest of 
Ireland. That too had negative implications. During the same debate, the Earl of 
Wicklow argued, “If the population of Ulster was exclusively Unionist, and the 
population of the three southern provinces exclusively Nationalist, it might be possible 
to arrive at a settlement by what is known as the policy of the exclusion of Ulster. But 
you cannot separate Ulster from the rest of Ireland without inflicting an abominable 
injustice, on the one hand, upon the Nationalist population of Ulster, and, on the other 
hand, upon the Unionist population of the three southern provinces.”35 The Home Rule 
problem was extremely complicated and there was not an easy solution that appeased 
both Nationalists and Unionists. It was, however, a problem created by hundreds of 
years of British policy and Catholic persecution, which makes it unsurprising that the 
British were unable to find a peaceful, diplomatic solution to what they called “the Irish 
Question.” This was the situation in Ireland on the eve of World War I with
34Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 15 (1914), cols. 56-144.
35 Ibid.
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Nationalists clamoring for Home Rule and Unionists fighting to stay within the United 
Kingdom. Over the next four years, the tension between these groups grew, which 
spilled over into wartime propaganda and conscription protests.
15
THE WAR AND NATIONALISM
In August of 1914, weeks after the German invasion of Belgium, Britain was 
thrust full force into the throngs o f war. The British committed hundreds o f  thousands 
o f  troops to the defense o f  Belgium and the protection o f France from the advancing 
Germans. The troops did not come from Britain alone as the dominions o f  the Empire 
also provided troops to supplement the influx into mainland Europe. It was at this point 
that Irish Member of Parliament John Redmond from Waterford, a Nationalist and 
fervent supporter o f  Home Rule, spoke in Parliament about the status o f  Ireland in the 
war. Redmond explained, “In no quarter o f  the world, I feel convinced, has the heroism 
o f the Belgian people been received with more genuine enthusiasm and admiration than 
within the shores o f  Ireland, and there is no compliment which it would be possible for 
the Irish people to pay to Belgium that they would not willingly pay, and there is no 
sacrifice I believe which Ireland would not be willing to make to come to their 
assistance. In this regard I am glad and proud to be able to think that at this moment 
there are many gallant Irishmen willing to take their share o f  the risks and to shed their 
blood and to face death in the assistance o f the Belgian people in the defense o f their 
liberty and their independence.”36 Thus Redmond became a symbol to Nationalist 
Irishmen o f the importance o f volunteering, as the fate o f  the war might also determine 
the fate of Ireland. Redmond encouraged the Irish to fight not on behalf of Britain but
36 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 66 (1914), cols.191-4.
rather to defend the rights of another small European country to self-determination. But 
Redmond also proved that he could be a useful tool for the British to recruit troops 
along Nationalist lines. Thomas Hennessy has argued that “Redmond’s offer of the Irish 
Nationalist Volunteers for home defense was, for many Nationalists, the limit of what 
Nationalist Ireland could offer to Britain, which, because it was in excess of what any 
Nationalist leader had previously offered in peace and war, had aptly demonstrated 
Nationalist Ireland’s imperial loyalty. It was duly expected that the British 
Government, and British and Irish Unionists, would recognize this and implement 
Home Rule.”37 Therefore, the contingency upon which Nationalist Ireland supported 
the war was that Britain would honor their promise of Home Rule.
After the war broke out, the Irish had a significant amount of men volunteering 
to fight in Irish Regiments within the British army. In fact, throughout the course of the 
war the Irish had nearly 150,000 men enlist (though some estimates place that number 
closer to 200,000, since official numbers did not take into account Irishmen fighting in 
non-Irish regiments). Irish volunteers enlisted in droves at the beginning of the war 
with over 50,000 men in the first six months alone (Table 1) and equally respectable 
numbers over the following year. The most significant drop occurred in the period 
between February and August of 1916 where recruits numbered less than half of the 
previous six-month period. This was due in large part to the change in public opinion 
following the Easter Rising in April 1916 where the tactics used by the British to 
suppress the rebellion and the subsequent execution of its leaders hardened the Irish 
Nationalist’s views of British colonial rule. Nevertheless, the strategy and propaganda




Table 1 Irish Volunteers in World War I (Adapted from Jeffrey)38
Period Total
August 1914 to February 1915 50,107
February 1915 to August 1915 20,235
August 1915 to February 1916 19,801
February 1916 to August 1916 9,323
August 1916 to February 1917 8,178
February 1917 to August 1917 5,609
August 1917 to February 1918 6,550
February 1918 to August 1918 5,812
August 1918 to November 1918 9,845
Total 140,460
used by the British to recruit Irish troops in Ulster and in the southern counties appealed 
to the very different political and religious affiliations of the regions.
In the south, British recruiting propaganda appealed to both the Nationalist 
movement and the predominant Catholic population. To appeal to the more moderate 
Nationalists, the British used a recruiting poster featuring John Redmond, prominent 
member of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), urging Irishmen to take their part in 
ending the war (Figure 2). At this point, moderate Nationalists (IPP) were the more 
dominant and powerful political group in the south. The more radical Separatists, Sinn 
Fein, were comprised of a relatively small portion of the population in 1914. Therefore, 
the recruiters appealed to the Nationalist ideals of the more moderate IPP when 
attempting to gain recruits. In addition, as Ben Novick has argued, “the pro-war forces
38 Keith Jeffrey, Ireland and the Great War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7.
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Figure 2 John Redmond Recruiting Poster39
in Ireland enjoyed the essential support, financially and legally, of the government, both 
in Britain and in the Irish Parliamentary Party.. .it meant that nationally famous figures 
[Redmond],. .would lend their weight and influence to the recruiting campaigns.”40 
With Redmond the British had a useful recruiting tool: he was a widely respected 
member of the IPP, loyal to the crown, but also a strong proponent of Home Rule. With 
his influence, the British were able to recruit soldiers along Nationalist lines as most
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moderate Nationalists believed that if  they followed Redmond’s advice they would be 
able to secure Home Rule for Ireland following the war.
The British also recruited in the southern colonies by appealing to the dominant 
Catholic religion. Though not all Nationalists were Catholics and neither were all 
Unionists Protestants, Catholicism had long divided Ulster from the southern counties 
and was often incorrectly equated with the Nationalist movement. In a recruiting poster 
aimed at Catholics, a rural farmer looks devoutly, hat in hand, at the ruins o f  a cathedral 
destroyed by the war (Figure 3). The caption below reads: “Can You any longer resist 
the Call?” Knowing that in order to recruit Catholics it was best not to stir up any anti- 
British sentiment, the poster focuses solely on appealing to Catholics to help other 
Catholics in Belgium and France. This call is thus not overtly Nationalist. It does, 
however, contain appeals to Irish Nationalism. First, the man in the poster is a farmer 
wearing respectable work clothes. His boots go up to his knees and his sleeves are 
rolled up past his elbows to protect his clothing from dirt. This poster appealed to the 
Irish farmer’s loyalty to the land in addition to his loyalty to the Catholic Church. The 
poster implicitly responded to the fact that Catholics were the group in Ireland with the 
least amount of volunteers. As Thomas Hennessy argued, “Given the historic nature of 
Nationalist Ireland’s relationship with the British Empire the level of Catholic 
enlistment into the British military appeared impressive. However, the debate on the 
constitutional future o f  Ireland also meant that the issue o f recruitment became the 
litmus test of the Irish Party’s claims that Irish Nationalism and British Imperialism 




Rule could work within Ireland and that Redmond’s and the IPP’s assertion of 
coexistence was indeed possible. The fact that Catholics did enlist proved that they 
could work alongside Protestants without these tensions getting in the way.43 
In Ulster, recruiting posters focused on the discourse of Empire, featuring elements of 
imperial power and the paternalistic nature of British Rule. In a recruiting poster seen 
in Ulster, a male lion stands in a position of power over younger lions under a caption
42 Central Council for the Organization of Recruiting in Ireland. Can You Any Longer Resist the Call?
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that reads, “The Empire Needs Men.” (Figure 4). Below the image the text reads, 
“Helped by the young lions, the old lion defies his foes.” This poster appealed to the 
pro-Empire sentiment in Ulster because it includes Ulster as part of the greater British 
Empire. Here Ireland is cast as one of the younger lions seeking to help the older, more 
powerful lion defeat his foes. In addition, the poster connotes the paternalistic rhetoric 
of Britain as an imperial power. The older lion, a traditional symbol of British imperial 
strength, can be viewed as a father figure who watches over and protects the younger 
lions that represent Britain’s colonies throughout the world. This puts the colonies in a 
position of dependency on Britain, though Britain is the one that needs their help in 
providing manpower at the front. But the image also suggested that the young lions will 
eventually grow up and become powerful imperial leaders in the future. The war, 
therefore, is the training ground for imperial men who will one day grow to take over 
from the older generation.44
Recruiting in Ulster was arguably easier than recruiting in the southern counties. 
In general, Ulster was more supportive of British rule and policies. Thomas Hennessy 
has argued that, “Unionist Ireland received Britain’s declaration of war in a manner 
which demonstrated its psychological integration into a British patriotism .. .Unionist 
support of Britain’s in the war was unqualified, demonstrated through the automatic 
acceptance of the righteousness of British actions.”45 Since Ulster was more inclined to 
follow Britain into war, the recruiting efforts highlighted the inclusion of Ireland as part 
of the United Kingdom and focused on the part Ireland could and should play to 
promote the British Empire. Thus, the recruitment materials took a pro-empire and
44Maria Baaz, The Paternalism o f Partnership (London: Zed Books, 2005); Uma Narayan, “Colonialism 




Figure 4. “The Empire Needs Men! 46
pro-British stance and propagated a sense o f  collective purpose.
Recruiting efforts in Ulster and in the southern counties called into question the 
notion of volunteerism. Since Irish Regiments in World War I were one hundred 
percent volunteers and no one was forced to fight in the war, the question o f why 
Irishmen decided to enlist arose. Some volunteered to fight for the glory of Britain and 
defense o f  the Empire, while others volunteered to fight for the glory o f Ireland and the
46Wardle, Arthur. The Empire Needs Men! The Overseas States : All Answer the Call : Helped By the 
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hope that their sacrifice would one day lead to a country of their own. However, the 
reasons for volunteering were not always so black and white. In fact, Irishmen had a 
number of motives for enlisting that often became more apparent as their experiences in 
the war shaped their politics. Sebastian Barry’s novel A  L ong, L o n g  W ay  follows the 
life of Willie Dunne, a young Irishman from a middle class Unionist family who enlists 
in the Royal Dublin Fusiliers in order to please his father, a staunch Loyalist. 
Throughout the course of the war, Willie is transformed by the mistreatment of Irish 
troops by the British, his witnessing of the Easter Rising in Dublin, and the execution of 
a young Irishmen who refused to continue fighting after the execution of the Easter 
Rising leaders. By the end of the war, Willie’s perception of the British has changed, 
and he begins to feel more of an affinity for the Nationalist movement in Ireland.
Barry’s novel shows the complexity of national consciousness within Ireland during 
World War I and the varying degrees of patriotism, loyalty, and duty. The people of 
Ireland were not simply divided into two categories: Nationalist and Unionist. These 
political positions were often unstable. In Ulster, the prominent British patriotism 
amongst Unionists seems to be the primary reason why Irishmen volunteered.
However, in the Nationalist movements in the southern colonies, the reasons seem to be 
a little more complicated. Whereas in Ulster men might enlist out of a sense of duty to 
defend their country, the Nationalists felt that they did not have a country to defend. 
Instead Nationalists defended the id ea  of a country. They felt that if  they enlisted they 
would one day have a country of their own. The possibility of Home Rule was a 
powerful recruiting tool in itself. However as the war progressed it became more
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evident that Home Rule remained only a dream as the tension in Ireland boiled over and 
the efforts towards a peaceful solution to the Irish question took a turn for the worse.47
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THE CONSCRIPTION DEBATES
By the time the House of Commons had voted to extend conscription to Ireland 
in April of 1918, it was hardly the first time that conscription had been debated in 
Parliament. In fact, conscripting the Irish had been discussed several times since the 
beginning of the war in 1914. During a debate in December of 1915, MP John 
Redmond (provolunteerism, but anticonscription) voiced his concerns over extending 
conscription to Ireland: “Therefore I say that if  it is proposed under present conditions 
and circumstances, I, for one, shall oppose it by every means in my power. I am 
convinced it would break up the unity of this country. It would be fiercely resented and 
fiercely opposed, not only on the floor of this House, but outside, and in the end, I am 
profoundly convinced, its result in point of men would be ridiculously small.”48 
Redmond worried, as other members of the Irish Party worried, that conscription would 
lead to further turmoil in Ireland and thereby destroy the Party’s hopes of attaining 
Home Rule following the war. In addition, Redmond felt that since the British would 
not gain many troops from conscription, the negative aspects far outweighed the 
positive. Finally, Redmond argued that Ireland had already recruited an impressive 
amount of troops for the war who had performed admirably on the front lines. He 
reasoned, “Not only by the numbers of men she has contributed has Ireland shown her 
view, but I think I may say with pardonable pride that her view has been emphasised
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 77 (1915), cols. 213-437.48
upon the battlefield by her sons at every seat of war, both in the East and in the West. I 
say that she is ready for any sacrifice which she considers necessary for the successful 
ending of this War, or, to put it lower, that she thinks is really calculated to lead to a 
speedy and successful ending of the War.”49 For Redmond, the sacrifice of the 
volunteers at the front was proof that Ireland was doing her part in helping to end the 
war. Conscription, he felt, would not produce the results the British had anticipated.
Redmond’s political rival and head of the Unionist Party in Ulster was Edward 
Carson, who was in favor of conscripting the Irish. During a debate on conscription in 
January of 1916 Carson argued, “I have been unable to find, as I have said, any 
argument which shows the difference between Ireland and the other parts of the United 
Kingdom, and in my heart I believe that when the hour of victory comes, as it certainly 
will, we who are Irishmen will feel ashamed to remember that we expected others to 
make sacrifices from which we provided our own exclusion.”50 Carson and the 
Parliamentary Unionists believed that conscripting the Irish was fair because Ireland 
was a part of the United Kingdom and therefore just as responsible as Scotland and 
Wales for providing conscripts. But the Parliamentary Unionists’ firm support of 
conscription prior to 1918 became an embarrassment when the British actually did vote 
through conscription for Ireland in 1918 and the Unionists turned around and 
vehemently opposed it. This led to the Nationalists calling the Unionists out on their 
“conditional loyalty” to Britain.
The debates around conscription between Redmond and Carson lend some 
insight into the political agendas of their respective parties. Redmond was against
49 Ibid.
50 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th Ser., vol. 77 (1916), cols. 1457-574.
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conscription because he saw Ireland as a separate political entity, on the eve of Home 
Rule, and in a precarious situation that should not be aggravated. He argued therefore 
that Ireland should be ex c lu d ed  from conscription. Carson, on the other hand, viewed 
Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and reasoned that she should therefore be 
in c lu d ed  in policies that were for the greater good of the Empire. The contrast between 
exclusion and inclusion in British policies is at the forefront of the Nationalist and 
Unionists debate and carried over into the Conscription Crisis of 1918. Nationalists 
constantly reiterated through their protests that Ireland should have self-determination 
and decide for themselves what course of action to take in the war. The Unionists (prior 
to 1918) argued that Ireland had a responsibility to shoulder some of the sacrifice in the 
war and should not be excluded from the same sacrifices made by others within the 
Empire.
In addition to Carson and Redmond, prior to the extension of conscription to 
Ireland, other members of Parliament voiced their opinions about Irish conscription. In 
May of 1916, a month after the events of the Easter Rising, a Military Service Bill was 
introduced in the House of Commons extending conscription to every male in Great 
Britain between the ages of eighteen and forty-one, both married and single. Once 
again, an amendment was proposed to extend conscription to Ireland. Sir John 
Lonsdale, a British Conservative and Home Rule opponent who served in the House of 
Commons under the Irish Unionist Party, argued that the reason that Britain had not yet 
conscripted the Irish was out of fear of sedition and rebellion, yet the Irish had rebelled 
anyway thereby negating that reason.51 “This rebellion has been suppressed,” he
28
51 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th Ser., vol. 82 (1916), cols. 472-620.
claimed, “and surely there is no longer any reason to anticipate that this measure of 
compulsion, with all the safeguards which are embodied in the Bill, would meet with 
serious objection in any quarter of Ireland.” “I am sure that every true Irishman must 
feel that the occurrences of Easter week have brought shame upon our country,” he 
further contended, “and I venture to urge once more upon my Nationalist fellow- 
countrymen that by agreeing to this Amendment they will show the whole world that 
Ireland is indeed at one with Great Britain and our Allies in prosecuting this War to a 
successful conclusion.”52
Sir Lonsdale’s argument was seemingly far removed from reality. He 
inaccurately asserted that after the quelling of the Easter Rising, conscription would not 
face any serious resistance in Ireland. In reality, public opinion had become more anti- 
British after the Rising, not necessarily because of the Rising itself, but because of the 
tactics used by the British to suppress it, specifically the execution of sixteen leaders of 
the rebellion. William O’Brien, a Nationalist MP from Cork, described the post-Rising 
situation in his city in these terms: “Cork has supplied more recruits than other parts of 
Ireland, and men from Cork have won four of the seven Victoria Crosses which have 
been awarded to Irishmen. Cork has, thank God, been free from the scenes which have 
drenched the streets of Dublin with blood, but our reward has been that.. .hundreds of 
men have been flung into gaol without charge stated, they have been treated with the 
utmost brutality.”53 O’Brien argued that the punishment for the Rising went far beyond 
the people who were directly involved. Furthermore, Sir Lonsdale’s assumption that 




a true Irishman was to be supportive of Great Britain. Did that mean that only 
Unionists or more moderate Nationalists were the only true Irishmen? The proponents 
o f  the Easter Rising and radical Nationalists argued conversely that they were indeed 
the true Irishmen.
In response to Sir Lonsdale’s proposal, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith (1908­
1916) advocated to exclude Ireland from the conscription bill. He argued, “without in 
any way prejudging the question raised by the hon. Gentleman as to whether or not 
compulsion, having been applied to the United Kingdom, ought or ought not to be 
applied to Ireland, I would beg o f him in the interests o f  the progress, o f  the Bill and the 
unity we hope to be able to obtain ill Irish opinion, and o f the pressing dangers and 
difficulties in that country which further controversy at this moment or in this House 
might inflame, I appeal to him and his friends, without in any way abandoning the 
position they have taken up, to withdraw this Amendment and allow us to proceed with 
the Bill in the form in which it is introduced.”54 Asquith, while not necessarily 
disagreeing with Sir Lonsdale, had more insight than his opponent, sensing that 
conscription in Ireland would, at this time, only make matters worse. Asquith was 
intent on not settling the question o f Irish conscription with this bill, and though he 
would only be Prime Minister for a few more months, he maintained that position for 
the remainder o f  the war. Winston Churchill, serving as Lieutenant Colonel at the time, 
maintained that Ireland should be conscripted but felt, like Asquith, that May o f 1916 
was not the right time to move forward with this initiative. Churchill argued that, “In 
spite o f  the serious losses to Ireland and the serious losses to Great Britain by the
5 4 Ibid.
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omission of Ireland by this Bill, I agree with the Government that it is not worth while 
at the present time to court a serious Irish row, with great embarrassment in the House 
of Commons, if  such a thing were possible, and with difficulties in the Government of 
Ireland. But I agree fully that this is not a question of mere logic or of fairness. It cannot 
be settled on those lines.”55 Churchill, like Asquith, cited the unrest in Ireland 
following the Rising as a reason not to pursue Irish conscription at this time; however, 
for many Irish Nationalist members of Parliament, the reasons not to conscript the Irish 
ran deeper than the failed rebellion.
William O’Brien cited the historical mismanagement of Ireland by Britain and 
the decades of hardships as reasons for not applying conscription to Ireland. “Here is a 
small agricultural country whose population has been diminished by millions within 
living memory by famine, by migration and by misgovernment,” he argued, “and you 
are actually expecting us to contribute the same proportion of recruits as a country like 
England, which is growing enormously every year in population and in wealth.”56 
O’Brien felt that it was wrong of Britain to expect a proportionate amount of soldiers in 
line with the rest of Great Britain given the disproportionate amount of wealth and 
people in England. Furthermore, O’Brien added that the Irish sacrifice for the war 
effort exists only to serve Britain, not Ireland. He stated, “I ask this House to-day to 
continue, as the Government have wisely done from the beginning, to recognise that 
they are dealing with a sensitive and sorely tried nation who have sealed their fidelity 
with their blood, blood that can be badly afforded, and not to victimise us or Ireland 




position of unexampled power and splendour for a century to come, whereas we shall 
have nothing, or next to nothing, in Ireland, except long years of repression and ruinous 
over-taxation.”57 Here O’Brien argued, as other Nationalist politicians had, that Ireland 
had already sacrificed many men for the war effort though the potential victory for 
Britain would do little to improve the Nationalist position in Ireland.
The Military Service Bill of 1916 passed through the House of Commons in 
May without an amendment to conscript the Irish. Once in the House of Lords, the 
omission of Irish conscription was debated once again. Lord Strachie of Britain,
Liberal politician and a proponent of Home Rule, lamented the exclusion of Ireland on 
the grounds that the sacrifice was not equal throughout Great Britain. He argued, “It 
seems to me a very great injustice that British mothers and British wives should have to 
give their nearest and dearest, while Irish mothers and Irish wives are able to keep their 
sons and husbands safely at home. Married men in Great Britain are asked not only to 
risk life and limb—which they are very ready to do—but also to suffer the loss of their 
businesses and the breaking up of their homes; whereas if they happened to live in 
Ireland they would be allowed to remain in perfect safety.”58 Lord Strachie’s argument 
epitomized the widespread British position on the extension of conscription to Ireland: 
the inequality of sacrifice. However, many Nationalist opponents to conscription 
argued that the Irish were not seen or treated as equal to Britons; therefore, should not 
be expected to sacrifice equally in relation to conscription.
In April of 1918, conscription was finally extended to Ireland; however, the bill 
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indicated their perception of Ireland as having an obligation to the United Kingdom. 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1916-1922) argued that, “the character of the 
quarrel in which we are engaged is just as much Irish as it is English. May I say it is 
more so—It is more Irish and Scottish and Welsh than it is even English.”59 He later 
stated that this was because the Great War was a war for small nations. The Irish 
representatives in Parliament argued that Ireland is not yet her own nation, since she 
cannot decide her own fate.60 However, Lloyd George reached the core of his reasoning 
when he stated: “The Irish representatives, and Ireland, through its representatives 
without a dissentient voice, committed the Empire to this war. They are fully as 
responsible for it as any part of the United Kingdom.”61 Ireland, he reasoned echoing 
Carson, as part of the United Kingdom had voted for waging the war, and were 
therefore responsible for providing men to fight it. Britain was thus justified in 
conscripting men within and throughout its kingdom. Furthermore, Lloyd George 
maintained that it was both “illogical” and “unjust” that other men within the realm 
were conscripted while the Irish were exempt.62 But the Irish representatives 
throughout this debate warned the Prime Minister that he would have another war front 
on his hands in Ireland should conscription be enacted as many of the Irish would rather 
rebel than allow themselves or their loved ones to be conscripted.63 However, the 
words of Lloyd George reflected the opinion of many prominent British men as to what 
the role of Ireland was within the Empire: a source of untapped manpower. Though
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Lloyd George argued that Ireland had representation in Parliament, there were not 
enough Irish representatives to carry a decision within the House of Commons, and 
consequently they were at the mercy of the British when voting on issues that concerned 
Ireland.
In an attempt to assuage the blow of conscription on the Irish, Lloyd George 
proposed a Home Rule Bill in Parliament on the same day as the Military Service Bill, 
while absorbing further jeers from the Irish representatives. He stated, “Whilst Great 
Britain is fighting for national rights in Europe with all her reserves of strength, she is 
prepared to concede the same rights in her own sphere of government.”64 It is unclear if 
Lloyd George felt this softened the blow of conscription or made conscription more 
enticing for Ireland, but for many of the Irish representatives it was too late for this 
concession. Home Rule had already been voted in prior to the start of the war in 1914, 
but never enacted. To package it now with compulsory service was considered by the 
Irish representatives to be another act of oppression and suggested that the government 
had indeed totally abandoned the 1914 promise.
Chancellor of the Exchequer Bonar Law registered his opinion during the 
debate, making it clear that the government would not waver on any of the major points 
of the bill, including Ireland.65 The Times noted that Law “declared that the Nationalists 
did not understand what the feeling in Great Britain was on this question and told them 
that it was a great mistake to suppose that the Government had put compulsion for 
Ireland in the Bill as a pious opinion.”66 Though it appears that the British government
64Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 104 (1918), cols. 1362-4.
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thought Irish conscription through before adding it to the Military Service Bill, Bonar 
Law may not have fully understood how the Nationalists or other Irishmen felt about 
Britain conscripting the Irish. His words illustrate the divide between Irish and British 
opinions of their relationship both in the present day and in the planned for future. In 
supposing that the Nationalists did not understand, Law demonstrated that he did not 
understand the condition of their relationship with Ireland. Law added, “ [the 
government] believed that it would make a difference of military strength, which made 
it their duty to face the consequences, whatever they might be.”67 Once again Law 
vocalized the popular British opinion that the Irish have a “duty” to serve Britain. 
However, the Nationalist Irish felt their duty was to Ireland, not Britain. Where one’s 
loyalty should lie and duty to one’s country were at the heart of the Irish conscription 
debates. For the Irish this was a complicated issue as they were members o f  two 
countries—Ireland and the United Kingdom— at the same time. The tension here was 
thus between competing loyalties. For the English, England, Britain, and the United 
Kingdom were generally synonymous whereas the same was not true for Ireland.68
On April 11, The London Times published an article that included a statement 
from Labour Party member George Barnes in response to the growing inevitability o f 
conscription protests in Ireland. In his statement, Barnes urged Ireland to be patient and 
hopeful of a peaceful solution.69 When asked if he thought Ireland would fight against 
conscription, Barnes replied, “I think there is no need for them to fight against 
conscription. Home Rule is right ahead. I know, o f  course, that in times gone by the
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68 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
69
35
“Impassioned Irish Protests,” The London Times, April 22, 1918.
Irish people have been led to within sight of the promised land, only to find it disappear 
like a mirage before their eyes.”70 While Barnes advocated Irish patience in attaining 
Home Rule, he also recognized that the previous times that the British had made such 
promises, they defaulted on them. This seems to be indicative of the divide between the 
Irish and British views on conscription. Barnes, a British politician, urged the Irish to 
show restraint because he viewed conscription as a stepping stone to Home Rule, 
whereas the Irish saw it as yet another mandate handed down by the British that 
impeded their move toward independence.
Though Barnes believed that the Irish should weather conscription, he was also 
aware that the situation in Ireland was precariously close to revolution. “Ireland is full 
of combustible material,” he stated, “there is an insurgent people on the one hand and 
the soldiery on the other. A spark on either side may kindle a feeling likely to create a 
disaster that would spoil everything.”71 Barnes saw that the tension in Ireland was 
already coming to a head, but he and other British politicians did not seem to view Irish 
conscription as anything that would be a tipping point towards an insurrection. Barnes 
saw the resolution of tensions in a peaceful, diplomatic solution that was beneficial to 
both countries. He echoed the sentiment of other Britons in viewing the future of 
Ireland and Britain as being one in which the two were linked within the United 
Kingdom, but with Ireland having Home Rule and thus control over local affairs. When 
asked about separation, Barnes explained, “Separation is not possible, and even if it 
were, it would be a bad thing for Ireland and bad for England. I believe that the 
interests of Ireland, as well as the interests of this country, lie in a closer union of
70 “Impassioned Irish Protests,” The London Times, April 22, 1918.
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sympathy and a desire to compose those differences which have embittered the political 
life of the United Kingdom for generations.”72 Like many others, Barnes could not 
dream of the day where Ireland existed independent of Britain. This British notion of a 
United Kingdom with Ireland as one country within it was one of the reasons why 
Britain felt they could conscript the Irish, just as they had done with Canada and 
Australia. They felt, as part of Britain, the Irish were just as subject to conscription as 
any group within the Empire. However, for the Irish representatives in Parliament this 
was a violation of their own perceived right to determine the fate of Irishmen.
During the House of Commons debates in April of 1918, Nationalist members 
of the IPP spoke out against Irish Conscription, notably Joseph Devlin of Belfast and 
John Dillon of Dublin. Devlin argued that the inclusion of Ireland in the Military 
Service Bill violated the Irish representatives’ right to self-determination. He stated, 
“Has the Prime Minister ever taken into consultation a single representative from 
Ireland upon this question, as to whether an unemancipated race should pay its blood 
tax to another. If we had our self-government.. .we should be consulted through the 
agency of our representatives in that self-elected Parliament. You put upon us a dual 
insult. You deny to us the right of self-government and then you will not allow us to 
determine whether the sons of our nation are to be conscripted into your army to fight 
your battles.”73 The argument that Devlin put forth echoed throughout the Conscription 
Crisis protests: the denial of an Irish government that could determine for themselves 
whether or not to conscript their men. Devlin also played on the concept of Ireland as a 
separate race of people, an argument that the British had used against them earlier.
72 “Impassioned Irish Protests,” The London Times, April 22, 1918.
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Similarly, John Dillon disputed Irish conscription on the grounds that it violated the 
very notion of the war as one “for small nationalities” because Ireland was denied her 
own bid for self-government. Dillon noted, “The Ireland you have to deal with is an 
ancient nation, and a very proud nation, and it has as intense a sense of national self­
consciousness as exists in the whole wide world. They see to-day Poland, Finland, and 
the Ukraine recognised by the great Powers of Europe as independent nations with the 
acclamation of His Majesty's Government, and Ireland, which is more ancient than any 
of them and has far more national self-consciousness, is not only to be denied her 
liberty, but is to be dragooned, with every circumstance of insolence and insult, and 
ordered to go out and fight for a people whose Government has broken faith with her 
over and over again.”74 Dillon, perhaps more than any other Irish MP, highlighted the 
hypocrisy of the British fighting a war in defense of other country’s nationalism and 
self-determination while at the same time suppressing those values in her own sphere of 
government.
Both Devlin and Dillon argued that when the British originally voted for 
conscription in 1916, and the subsequent extensions that followed, as Irish 
representatives they had not cast a vote. They felt that they did not have a right to vote 
for a policy that would affect men who were not within their jurisdiction. The Irish, 
they reasoned, who were not to be conscripted by this legislation should not therefore 
decide whether or not the British should be conscripted. They were therefore outraged
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when Irish conscription was added to the Military Service Bill without consulting the 
Irish MPs.75
Outside of Parliament, other prominent British men came out in support of Irish 
conscription. An article in Dublin’s F reem an’s Journal reported the opinion of Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle, of whom it was claimed exhibited a typical attitude of the British. 
Doyle argued, “That while Britain is fighting for freedom, Ireland is ‘wrangling over 
her parish pump’.”76 The Journal explained that this was the common view of 
Englishmen who saw the Irish protests and their persistent clamor for Home Rule as 
inappropriate during such a violent war. However, the Journal argued that if  Ireland is 
“wrangling over her parish pump” then “so also are Belgium, Serbia, Poland and 
Armenia, for in all five countries the issue is precisely the same— a determination to 
decide their own destinies without interference or intervention by outsiders.”77 The 
Journal chastised Doyle for being ignorant of Irish conditions and suggests that instead 
he reproach England for denying Ireland the right to determine for herself the best 
course for Ireland.
Although Conan Doyle’s views were typical of English public opinion, not 
everyone in Britain supported Irish conscription, and many Britons came forward in the 
following weeks to speak out against it. The London branch of the Labour Party issued 
a statement that denounced Irish conscription calling it, “an outrage against the 
principles of liberty of small nations and self-determination of peoples, and calculated
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to serious loss of life in Ireland.”78 The London Times reported that all British members 
of Parliament did not support conscripting the Irish. However, they cautioned their 
readership that out o f  the one hundred members who rejected the Bill, “sixty eight o f 
the members.. .were Irish Nationalists of one type or another, and the remainder were 
chiefly of the ‘pacifists’ groups.”79 The Times ’ choice of language lumped Irish 
Nationalists in with the pacifists, a word, which at the time connoted someone cowardly 
or weak as conscientious objection, though legal, was highly stigmatized.80 Their 
coverage thus implicitly undermined both the moral authority o f  those who objected to 
Irish conscription and Ireland’s contribution to the war that included nearly 200,000 
volunteers by 1918. In addition, the statement negated the real reasons for Irish 
Nationalist opposition, o f  which an objection to the war was only a small part. But 
opposition to Irish conscription came not merely from groups the Times felt comfortable 
dismissing. Former Prime Minister Asquith felt that the provision o f the Military 
Service Bill that included Irish Conscription should be removed. The Times reported 
that Asquith had “argued that compulsion could not be introduced in Ireland today with 
any approach to general consent, and went so far as to say that it would be an act o f 
terrible shortsightedness to precede the grant o f  self-government by imposing upon 
Ireland a measure which was obnoxious to a very large number of the people.”81 As
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Asquith pointed out, with self-government in the fray, conscripting and arming the Irish 
would be imprudent.82
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AN IRISH UNIFICATION AND THE 
PROTEST FRONT IN IRELAND
Prior to the passage of the Military Service Bill in Parliament there was a 
growing fear in Ireland as to how conscription would affect the already fragile political 
stability. There were Unionists who supported continued membership in the United 
Kingdom. There were also Nationalists who wished to have Home Rule, defined by 
local self-government within the United Kingdom, represented by the Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP). Finally there were Republicans who wanted a free Irish 
republic separate from Britain, represented by the Sinn Fein Party. These groups had a 
tenuous peace in Ireland and many feared that any more pressure from Parliament 
would cause tensions to boil over. Before 1918, most of the Irish were under the 
impression that the British would not attempt to conscript them because “it was 
believed that the Government would be afraid to defy the Nationalist Party and to risk 
the prospect of serious resistance from the Sinn Feiners.”83 By April of 1918, however, 
the “pressures of public opinion in Great Britain” had “become very strong,” leading to 
the prospect of Britain enacting conscription in Ireland.84
The Military Service Bill of 1918 was intended to extend conscription within the 
United Kingdom to men (both single and married) from eighteen years old to fifty-five.
83 “Irish Manpower,” The London Times, April 9, 1918.
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It was argued that the British public would not accept another widening of the pool of 
conscripts with concessions to Ireland. Alan J. Ward noted, “with the German offensive 
a week old and full of menace, the cabinet made the assumption that parliamentary and 
public opinion would oppose an extension of conscription which exempted Ireland 
again. They pushed ahead with their plans which now included both conscription and, 
albeit very ill-defined, Home Rule for Ireland.”85 With Parliament and the British 
public facing a possible defeat in the war with German advances in the spring of 1918, 
the argument that Britain had done their share of sacrificing while Ireland had not 
became paramount. In addition, John Stubbs argued, “the government decided, past 
promises to the contrary, to introduce Irish conscription. Politically it was impossible to 
extend conscription further in Great Britain without attempting to deal with Ireland as 
well.”86 Therefore, in order to assuage public opinion, the British voted to sacrifice 
Ireland for the cause of the war.
In Ireland, the Irish Parliamentary Party stood to lose the most politically from 
conscription. The Nationalist Press claimed, “that to try to enforce conscription would 
be an act of insanity, that it would kill every chance of a political settlement, and that it 
would create a new war front in Ireland.”87 The Nationalists were worried that 
everything they had worked for in Parliament would be undone. However, they also 
feared the enactment, but not enforcement, of conscription driving up support for their 
political opponents, Sinn Fein. The London Times reported, “On the one hand the 
enactment of compulsion for Ireland in the teeth of their opposition in the House of
85 Ward, 111.
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Commons would strengthen the case that Nationalist representation at Westminster is a 
fraud. On the other hand, the Government’s refusal to enforce the enacted principle 
through fear of physical resistance would allow Sinn Fein to boast that it and it alone 
had saved Ireland from conscription.”88 For the Irish Parliamentary Party, Irish 
conscription represented both an external and internal risk. However, as the reality of 
conscription unfolded, it became clear to the leaders of Ireland that a unified front 
would be necessary in order to defeat it. This meant setting aside political differences 
for the greater good of Ireland.
One of the most momentous occurrences during the Conscription Crisis was 
the unification of Nationalist sects in the southern counties against the threat of 
conscription. In a meeting at the Mansion House in Dublin, the residence of the Lord 
Mayor, on April 18, 1918, leaders from the three most prominent Nationalist parties 
(the Irish Party, Sinn Fein, and the All-For-Ireland Party) and leaders from trade unions 
gathered to discuss how to protest the infliction of conscription. Trade unions formed a 
large part of the Labour Party and would be instrumental in arranging strikes to protest 
conscription. At the end of the conference, the delegates issued a resolution that 
demonstrated their solidarity in protesting conscription. The resolution stated, “Taking 
our stand on Ireland’s separate and distinct nationhood and affirming the principle of 
liberty that the Governments of nations derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed, we deny the right of the British Government, or any external authority, to 
impose compulsory service in Ireland against the clearly expressed will of the Irish 
people. The passing of the Conscription Bill by the British House of Commons must be
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regarded as a declaration of war on the Irish nation. The alternative to accepting it, as 
such, is to surrender our liberties and to acknowledge ourselves slaves.”89 The language 
used in the resolution urged the public to not only protest conscription, but to protest it 
along Nationalist lines. The resolution mentioned “Ireland’s separate and distinct 
nationhood” and “consent of the governed,” indicating that the protest was more about 
self-determination and Irish sovereignty than about Irish conscripts.90 The resolution 
also referred to Britain as an “external authority,” claiming that to accept conscription 
would be “to acknowledge ourselves slaves.” This showed that the Nationalists viewed 
Ireland as ruled rather than governed by Britain and reiterated their position that they be 
excluded from British policies. The Nationalist rhetoric from the Mansion House 
resolution filtered down and infiltrated all aspects of anticonscription discourse.
The Conscription Crisis led to mass political mobilization and polarization in 
Ireland. While the Irish Party used it as an opportunity to further advocate Home Rule, 
a far more radical Nationalist party Sinn Fein used it as an opportunity to advocate 
complete separation from Britain. Sinn Fein, once a small portion of the Nationalist 
movement in Ireland, became increasingly popular throughout the war and even more 
so following the Conscription Crisis, leading to overwhelming victories throughout 
Ireland in the General Election of 1918. Meanwhile, the Unionists in Ulster used the 
Crisis as an opportunity to reiterate their anti-Separatist stance while at the same time 
expressing their displeasure with Britain whom they felt sacrificed them for the war 
effort by marrying Home Rule and conscription. Protests against Irish conscription
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were therefore manifestations of these different political movements and the Crisis was 
quickly absorbed into their often competing agendas.
In the anticonscription propaganda a number of political cartoons illustrated the 
Nationalist feeling towards conscription. The image in Figure 5 depicts John Bull (the 
national personification of Britain) tying himself to Erin (the female personification of 
Ireland) as a German wave of water approaches. John Bull’s features are ugly, 
distorted, and menacing while Erin is graceful and delicate. The image implies that 
Britain is losing the war in Europe (as many thought at the time) and by conscripting
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Figure 5. “Conscription”91
91 Novick, 209.
the Irish they were going to take Ireland down with them. The image is a manifestation 
o f  Nationalist rhetoric as it implies that in the current situation Ireland is literally “tied” 
to Britain. The only way to save themselves would thus be to sever these ties once and 
for all.
Another anticonscription political cartoon had far more serious implications for 
politics in Ireland. The image in Figure 6 represents the far more radical side of the 
Nationalist movement. The image does not implicate Britain so much as it castigates 
John Redmond and the Irish Party for selling out Ireland to the British. The image is of 
John Redmond as a butcher to Her Majesty’s Government, carving up Ireland and 
selling “prime young Irishmen” to Britain. Though Redmond had died in March, the 
image accuses him and the Irish Party o f  offering up Irish soldiers for slaughter in order 
to secure Home Rule for Ireland. The words “We Kill All Our Own” implied that 
Redmond’s support of Irish volunteerism was responsible for the number of Irish dead 
and the only way to rectify the situation was to cease selling soldiers to Britain. This 
political cartoon was meant to have the effect of driving up further support for Sinn 
Fein and the separation of Ireland from Britain.
The language used throughout the anticonscription protests in the South 
indicates the increased popularity o f  the Nationalist movement. The protests used such 
words and phrases as self-determination, sovereignty, alien government, and act o f 
oppression. The change in language reflects the change in Nationalist opinion in 
Britain. The majority o f  Nationalists no longer were content to have Home Rule, which 
would mean they would still owe allegiance to the King. Instead, the majority of 
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Figure 6. “Redmond & Co.”92
creation of an Irish Republic. In 1918 alone, membership in Sinn Fein nearly doubled 
(see Table 2) and in the General Election of 1918 Sinn Fein won nearly every 
parliamentary seat in the southern counties. The protests in the southern counties thus 
reflect this shift in Nationalist allegiance.
Anticonscriptionists began to hold public meetings to protest what they now 
termed a “Declaration of War.” An advertisement in the Nenagh Guardian called for a 
public demonstration at the courthouse square and stated that it is to, “protest against 
the compulsory conscription of Ireland’s manhood by an Alien Government, and to
92 Novick, 219.
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Table 2 Sinn Fein Membership 1917-1918 (Adapted from Hennessey)93
December 1917 December 1918
Province Clubs Members Clubs Members
Ulster 230 12,534 308 24,103
Leinster 243 15,125 320 23,234
Connaught 239 14,917 310 26,317
Munster 327 23,694 416 38,426
Total 1,039 66,270 1,354 112,080
pledge ourselves to resist it by the most effective means at our disposal.”94 The phrase 
“Alien Government” was especially effective because it denoted a government that is 
foreign, unwanted, and out of touch with the needs of Irish people. “Alien” also 
signified that the government in charge was Britain’s government, not Ireland’s 
government, suggesting that Ireland was not in charge of her own affairs. The 
advertisement also declared, “Assemble in your thousands and join in the fight against 
this new act of oppression by the enemies of our country.”95 Whereas the British used 
such words as “duty” and “obligation” when discussing conscripting the Irish through 
the Military Service Bill, this advertisement saw the bill not as an act of duty, but an 
“act of oppression” by “enemies.” The language used in this advertisement was 
obviously targeting Republicans and Sinn Feiners who already had preconceived 
notions about British rule. It played on their already negative views towards the British 
and equated conscription with an act of war against the Irish. However, looking back to 
the declaration adopted by the leaders of Ireland at the Mansion House, they too called
93 Hennessey, 223.
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the bill a declaration of war, which demonstrated how well the language of protest 
permeated the country. While this advertisement attracted a certain kind of Irishmen, 
there were others that were less radical, yet equally effective.
Another ad in the Nenagh Guardian posted by the Urban District Council also 
called for a public meeting to discuss protest options.96 This advertisement, however, 
used more moderate language in order to attract attendees. It called for those to gather, 
“to consider what methods may be adopted to ensure our cooperation with all of our 
fellow countrymen in the immediate future.”97 In addition, the ad revealed that, 
“speakers of every shade of political opinion have promised to attend.”98 This ad 
differed significantly from the previous ad because the wording was more inclusive of 
all Irishmen. While the previous ad appeared to polarize the people of Ireland and 
called for a more radical approach to protest, this ad sought to unify the people of 
Ireland no matter what their political allegiance. By calling for “cooperation” with 
others and including speakers from different political parties, the Urban District Council 
of Nenagh hoped to present a unified front in the protest against conscription. In fact, 
many of the protests worked against any divide between radicals on one side and more 
moderate Nationalists on the other. Furthermore, the Irish Independent reported that, 
“the movement for an All-Ireland covenant in opposition grows.. .Rev. Dr. Foley 
advises Irishmen to put aside all differences and unite and organize against the
96 “Conscription of Ireland,” Nenagh Guardian, April 6, 1918.
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threatened danger.”99 Many recognized that a divided stand would make the country 
vulnerable to conscription, but a cohesive protest would be much more effective.
One o f the most prominent groups to protest conscription in Ireland was the 
Catholic priests and bishops who protested the act on moral grounds. Among the most 
outspoken members of clergy was Cardinal Michael Logue. Prior to the passage of the 
Military Service Bill, Cardinal Logue anticipated Irish conscription and spoke out 
against it. In a statement issued on April 10, Logue stated that, “since the outbreak of 
hostilities four years ago the War Office has shown such utter lack o f  real touch with 
Irish conditions that it is quite possible something may now be proposed which, if 
attempted, would only crown the disasters which want o f  knowledge and want o f 
sympathy have already entailed.”100 Logue not only foreshadowed the events of the 
next two months, but he also stressed how dated the British government was when it 
came to the Irish, insisting that a policy o f conscription would be enacted because o f 
ignorance o f real Irish conditions. “Had the government in any reasonable time given 
Ireland the benefit o f  the principles, which are declared to be at stake in the war, by the 
concession o f a full measure o f  self-government, there would have been no occasion for 
contemplating forced levies from her now,” Logue argued.101 Here Logue reached the 
crux of a divisive issue. Had Britain granted Home Rule to Ireland back in 1914, prior 
to the start o f  the war, Britain would not be in this predicament. Had Ireland had her 
own government and self-determination, there would most likely be more Irish 
volunteers and perhaps even conscription enacted by Ireland on her own people.
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However, as Britain had chosen not to grant Home Rule in 1914, and in 1918 only 
wished to do so with conscription, the British, Logue chided, faced a political disaster 
entirely of their own making.
North of Dublin, in Cavan, a gathering of priests and bishops took part in “what 
was probably the largest demonstration held in Cavan.”102 The message that emanated 
from this protest was anticonscription, though it carried a far more radical opinion than 
the moderate reasoning of Logue. Reverend B. Gaffney presided over the 
demonstration and reiterated that, “it is not a political meeting, but a meeting where 
men of all shades of political opinion are asked to join hands and ward off a dreadful 
calamity that threatens our young men and old men, too.”103 By articulating that it was 
not a political meeting, the reverend was breaking down any differences in political 
thought that the attendees might have had in the hopes that they could put up a unified 
front against conscription. This protest stressed the importance of the Catholic Church 
backing the anticonscription position. Moderate Nationalists and Republicans alike 
were largely Catholic and by breaking down these political barriers, the Catholic 
Church became a key factor in unifying public opinion in Ireland to protest 
conscription. In addition, by dictating that the meeting was not political, Gaffney 
confirmed that the Catholic stance to oppose conscription was on moral grounds. He 
added, “this war was started without our consent and without consulting the people of 
this country, besides our country has given more than its share of manpower.. .In 
justice, no nation under the sun can be compelled to make war against the will of the
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inhabitants, but that is what is going to be imposed on Ireland by conscription.”104 The 
Irish volunteers who served for Britain did so of their own free will, as they supported 
the cause. However, the point that Gaffney was trying to make was that the act of 
conscripting the Irish against her will was an immoral action on the part of the British. 
No matter what political line of thought was taken, the action was still immoral in the 
eyes of the Catholic Church. The Reverend concluded, “When Irishmen, as a nation, 
with their own parliament, proclaim war, then you may depend you will have men able 
and willing to fight, and fight like genuine Irishmen—with all of their heart and will.”105 
Other members of the Irish clergy confirmed the immorality of conscription in 
letters and protests. A letter from Reverend P. O’Connell read at the Cavan 
demonstration stated, “Our bishops declare the conscription of a nation without its 
consent to be unjustifiable, a n d . i t  is immoral, and, therefore resistance is a duty.”106 
Contrary to the British use of the word “duty” when debating conscription, Irish 
Catholics saw it as a duty to resist the immorality of conscription, whereas the British 
saw it as a duty as part of Britain to fight, even if unwillingly. Furthermore, the Irish  
Independent reported, “Further utterances by members of the Irish Hierarchy deal with 
the moral right of the Irish people to refuse conscription imposed by England, and their 
Lordships again assure their flock that bishops and priests will stand firmly beside them 
through the crisis.”107 Finally, nearly ten days after Cardinal Logue’s original 
statement, he presided over a gathering of the bishops of Ireland. The meeting 
culminated with the release of a statement that proposed a unified resolution. It read,
104“What was probably the largest,” Meath Chronicle, April 20, 1918.
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“In view especially of the historic relations between the two countries from the very 
beginning up to the present moment, we consider that conscription forced in this way 
upon Ireland is an oppressive and inhuman law, which the Irish people have a right to 
resist by all the means that are consonant with the law of God.”108 This statement 
solidified Catholic resistance to conscription and as it was delineated to the parishes, 
encompassed a wider group of protesters across the country.
The Catholic Church, more than any other group in Ireland, was responsible for 
unifying Irish opinion against conscription and rallying people of different political 
backgrounds to come together in protest. Without the Catholic Church, the protests 
would not have been nearly as effective as they were. Contrastingly, in Britain, both 
opposition and support of Irish Conscription was confined to isolated groups and 
political parties, notably the Labour Party and working-class industrial centers such as 
Liverpool and Manchester. Although public opinion was in favor of extending 
conscription to the Irish, there was hardly a unified front like the one found in Ireland.
Other groups that figured to be instrumental in conscription protests were the 
labor unions that not only organized strikes and rallies, but also became some of the 
most radicalized of all objectors. Some, like the Donegal Flaxgrowers and Farmer’s 
Association, protested on the grounds that they needed all available men to grow food 
for the increased demand of the government, and conscription robbed them of workers 
needed to do this.109 Others, such as the Irish Transport Workers, vowed to resist 
conscription “with all of their might” and predicted a successful protest because “in 
England the working classes put up a good fight against conscription, but they had not
108 “Irish Bishops Meet,” Irish Independent, April 19, 1918.
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sufficient backbone, but the Irish working classes would show when the time came that 
they had the backbone.”110 The trade unions played a similar role as the Catholics in the 
Irish Conscription Crisis in that they helped to unify opposition.
In Ireland, the place that could have posed the biggest challenge to the 
anticonscription position was Ulster. As the Irish Conscription Crisis unfolded, it 
became clear that even in Ulster, with some exceptions, conscription was unpopular.
The Irish Independent reported prior to the passage of the Military Service Act that, 
“even Ulster Unionists do not want conscription.. .Ulster is just as much against 
conscription as the rest o f  Ireland, and the government will be only courting disaster, 
and making Ireland still more an international question by forcing military service on 
this country.”111 Unionists did not support the Nationalists’ claims to self-determination 
on which their anticonscription protest rested. Rather, conscription was unpopular in 
Ulster because the British Parliament had packaged it with a guarantee of Home Rule.
A Belfast correspondent to the Irish Independent argued that, “if the Prime Minister had 
set himself the task o f  finding the likeliest means to create unrest in Ulster he could not 
have succeeded better than in his plan to link a Home Rule Parliament with 
conscription.”112 Conscription was thus not the main issue for Ulster Unionists; the 
problem with the legislation was that Home Rule would have put Ulster at the mercy o f 
a southern-dominated parliament. The Belfast correspondent added that in 
conversations with “men whose opinions matter” “all welcomed conscription, but they 
made it perfectly clear that they do not mean to go under a Dublin Parliament. Ulster’s
110 “Labour Opposition,” Freeman’s Journal, April 10, 1918.
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112
55
“Press and the Crisis,” Irish Independent, April 12, 1918.
opposition to Home Rule would be infinitely more dangerous to the Empire than it 
would have been four years ago.”113 This statement highlighted a key distinction 
between how the North viewed their relationship with Britain as opposed to the South.
In Ulster, where British support was substantial, supporters of conscription felt that the 
British dishonored their loyalty by attaching Home Rule to conscription. This 
correspondent warned Britain thus not to take Ulster’s loyalism for granted, especially 
at a moment when the future of the British Empire lay in the balance.
In Ulster, Unionists vehemently opposed conscription because of the addendum 
of Home Rule on the bill. Sir Edward Carson, a firm advocate for conscription in all 
other instances, ironically voted against the Bill in Parliament. Carson maintained that, 
“the one thing I regret in this Bill is that the Government should have mixed up with it 
the question of Home R u le .  No local Parliament that has ever been proposed has 
suggested, nor have hon. Members opposite ever suggested, that any local Parliament 
should undertake Imperial Defence.. .I warn the Government that they may be raising 
two agitations— one against Conscription and a second in regard to Home Rule—both 
of which may equally affect the operations of the Act which they have in mind. For my 
own part all I care about is that the country is in danger.”114 This opposition to 
conscription packaged with Home Rule indeed led to massive protests in Ulster that 
used their antiseparatism as a mode of remonstration at a time when the British 
government could scarce afford unrest on two fronts.
Many Unionists read the conscription bill as a broken promise that they would 
not have to endure the consequences of Home Rule. In protesting conscription
113 “Press and the Crisis,” Irish Independent, April 12, 1918.
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predominantly Protestant Ulsterites were actually resisting Home Rule and willing to 
sacrifice an Irish draft to uphold this principle. The F reem an’s Journal argued that the 
Unionist press had solved the problem of their Loyalism “very ingeniously by declaring 
that, as Mr. Lloyd George has broken his pledges to Ulster by proposing to introduce a 
Home Rule Bill, Ulster is free to revise her pledges about conscription.”115 The phrases 
“broken pledge” and “at the mercy of the south” are ever-present in the Unionist 
protests. Unionists felt betrayed by Britain’s addition of Home Rule to the bill as they 
were ever fearful of having to be subservient to a southern-dominated parliament.
Hence their protests were not a protest of conscription per se; rather they were an attack 
on Home Rule and on Britain for reneging on her promises to Ulster.
That anticonscriptionism crossed political and religious lines should have further 
united the movement. At a meeting in Belfast an anti-conscription campaigner argued 
that, “the proposed coercive application to Ireland of conscription is contrary to the 
assurances and pledges of English Ministers, and is really a pretext to gain ulterior and 
sinister objects.”116 He therefore suggested that Nationalists and Unionists unite against 
conscription.117 Rather than presenting a unified front, the Conscription Crisis became 
an opportunity for Nationalists to call Unionists on what they construed as their 
conditional loyalty. “It is notorious that Unionist Ulster is as strongly opposed to 
conscription as any part of Ireland,” argued an article in the F reem an’s Journal, an 
unconditionally Nationalist newspaper. “But the difficulty of the Carsonites is that they 
professed to welcome a measure which they heartily abhorred, and open opposition to it
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now would reveal their former acceptance as no more than a piece of political 
trickery.”118 In defense of the Unionists, the previous times conscription was 
considered, Home Rule was not attached to it. Nationalists, however, often accused of 
conditional loyalty themselves, couldn’t resist the opportunity to turn this rhetoric back 
on the Unionists. The Journal added, “Orangemen used to protest loudly against the 
charge of ‘conditional loyalty’ but.. .their ‘loyalty’ to the Empire at this crisis is 
conditional with a vengeance.”119 Although the Conscription Crisis unified Ireland in 
protest, it was not enough to end the tensions between Nationalists and Unionists.
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EPILOGUE
In the end, conscription was never enforced in Ireland. It is not clear whether or 
not the protests had any effect on the British decision to abandon Irish conscription, 
given the other factors at play. The British enjoyed a surge in troops due to the arrival 
of American forces at the front, the ground lost to Germany in the winter and spring of 
1918 had been regained, and the overall outlook of the war was favorable to the Allies. 
The small number of Irish troops the British would have attained through conscription 
were thus no longer necessary.120 However, merely the idea of conscription had sent 
Ireland into turmoil and had permanently changed the nature of Anglo-Irish politics. 
Indeed, the conscription crisis had many more implications for Ireland than it ever had 
for the war effort and led directly to the rise of Sinn Fein as the most powerful 
Nationalist party. By linking conscription with Home Rule, the concept of “Home Rule 
was permanently discredited, it was made clear that a Home Rule parliament would lack 
the power to decide what was literally a life and death issue for its constituents”121 
Given that Home Rule was no longer enough for Nationalists, the moderate IPP that had 
supported it also collapsed in the wake of the Conscription Crisis, losing almost all of 




In the years that followed, violence erupted in the events of the Irish 
Revolution, the Anglo-Irish War, and the Irish Civil War as the Republican movement 
took over the southern counties and Ulster Unionists tried desperately to hold onto the 
United Kingdom. Ultimately, the southern counties separated and formed the Republic 
of Ireland and Ulster was sectioned off and renamed Northern Ireland, leading to further 
violence that haunted the rest of the twentieth century. The Conscription Crisis was not 
the most prominent event in the decade that featured other more watershed moments 
such as the Easter Rising, the Dublin Lockout, and the Anglo-Irish Treaty, but it did 
serve to expose the complexity of political factions within Ireland and the intricacy of 
their relationships with the British. The Conscription Crisis was a catalyst for the 
unification of the factionalized Nationalist movements in Ireland. Ultimately, it united 
the Nationalists under the Sinn Fein banner, put an end to the idea that Home Rule was 
sufficient, and led to the creation of a separate Irish state built along Republican lines.
The significance of the Conscription Crisis lies therefore not in the event itself 
but rather in its impact on Anglo-Irish relations in the aftermath of World War One. 
Conscription was never put into practice; the Crisis was thus only a response to a threat, 
though a very real one. However, the Conscription Crisis was not merely about 
conscription, and whether or not it was enacted was in the end of little consequence. By 
passing the Military Service Bill of 1918, the British had demonstrated that they had the 
right to legislate for the Irish without their consent. This proved to the Irish that they 
had little recourse to prevent or stop further British oppression, thus showing that Irish 
representation at Westminster was inconsequential. With political and diplomatic 
means of resolution debilitated, the Irish had very few options to ensure that their own
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rights and liberties were safeguarded, hence the rise in Republicanism in the immediate 
post-war period. Most importantly, the Conscription Crisis confirmed that the Irish 
lacked the right to self-determination and proved that right would not be granted so long 
as Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom.
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